https://brown-csci1660.github.io

CS1660: Intro to Computer Systems Security
Spring 2026

Lecture 2: Intro to Security & Cryptography

Instructor: **Nikos Triandopoulos**

January 27, 2025

BROWN

CS1660: Announcements

- Override requests: Status update

Please communicate your decision as soon as you can

Course	Approved	& S02	& 2660	Waiting	Capstone	Concurrent	In Cart	Not In Cart	Enrolled
1620 S01	9			1	2	0	2	5	2
1660 S01	51	1	6	9	2	3	19	11	21
1660 S02	8			0	0	0	4	2	3
2660 S01	26	3		0	0	3	9	11	12
2660 S02	4			0	0	1	3	0	4
In person	77								33
Remote	12								7
Total	89			9	2	7			40

CS1660: Announcements

- Course updates
  - Homework 0 is due today
  - Project 0 is due tomorrow
  - Please make sure you have access to Ed Discussion and Gradescope

CS1660: Announcements

- **2 in-class exams (20%)**
  - **one around mid term, one around reading period**
- 4 Homeworks (20%)
- Projects (60%)
  - Cryptography: Learn cryptographic principles
  - Flag: Break a web application
  - Handin: Circumvent OS privileges
  - Final project: Design, build, test a secure system

Last class

- Course logistics

Today

- Introduction to Computer Security
  - Motivation
  - Basic security concepts
- Cryptography
  - Secret communication
    - Symmetric-key ciphers & classical ciphers
    - Perfect secrecy & the One-Time-Pad cipher

2.0 Secure outsourced computation

Another example: Tax return preparation…

Involves information collection & processing

- calculate financial data
  - payroll, profits, stock quotes, …
- manage data
  - search emails, store records, …
- submit – done!

… by many unknown machines!

Data & computation outsourcing

Cloud-based services

- hardware, OS, software, apps, …
- storage, computation, databases, analytics, …

Transformative multi-platform technology

- businesses, organizations or individuals
- client-server, distributed, P2P, Web-based, …

Internet protocols **social networks** **big-data analytics** **sharing economy** **FinTech**

Security consequences

Fact: Untrusted interactions

- information is processed outside one's administration control or "trust perimeter"

Risk: Falsified / leaked information

- information may (un)intentionally altered by or shared with unauthorized entities

Goal: Integrity / privacy safeguards for outsourced assets

- need to protect information against change, damage / unauthorized access

What can go wrong?

Fact: Untrusted interactions

- information is processed outside one's administration control or "trust perimeter"

Risk: Falsified / leaked information

- information may (un)intentionally altered by or shared with unauthorized entities

Goal: Integrity / privacy safeguards for outsourced assets

- need to protect information against change, damage / unauthorized access

Threats:

- misconfigurations, erroneous failures, limited liability
- economic incentives of cost-cutting providers
- compromises, attacks, advanced persistent threats (APTs)

Limited liability

AI Overview

+5

Based on the AWS Customer Agreement, AWS is not liable for data loss, unauthorized access, or deletion of customer content, as users are responsible for their own data security and backups. This disclaimer covers data corruption, failure to store, or alteration.

Key aspects of this limitation:

- **Shared Responsibility:** Under the AWS model, you are responsible for securing your own data, applications, and configurations.
- **Data Loss & Destruction:** AWS expressly disclaims liability for the deletion, destruction, damage, or failure to store your content.
- **Unauthorized Access:** AWS is not responsible for unauthorized access to your account or content.
- **Liability Caps:** In most cases, if a claim arises, damages are limited to the amount paid in the 12 months prior.

This clause ensures that AWS provides the infrastructure, while you are responsible for backing up and securing your applications on that infrastructure.

"[We will] not be responsible for any damages arising in connection with any unauthorized access to, alteration of, or the deletion, destruction, damage loss or failure to store any of your content or other data."

Amazon Web Services customer agreement

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)

Sophisticated well-targeted cyber-attack campaigns

- aim for unauthorized data manipulation or exfiltration
- employ rich attack vectors & highly adaptive strategies
  - social engineering
  - zero-day vulnerabilities
  - low-and-slow progression
  - intelligence

extremely hard-to-defend
or even hard-to-detect

…	
RSA	(2011)
Bit9	(2013)
Dyn	(2016)
Equifax	(2017)
…	

World's biggest data breaches & hacks



"Information is beautiful" by David McCandless

- Selected losses > 30K records
- Up to Sep 2015

Real cases: Threats against integrity Vs. confidentiality

Figure 6: VERIS A⁴ grid depicting associations between actors, actions, assets, and attributes



	External.Malware	External.Hacking	External.Social	External.Misuse	External.Physical	External.Error	External.Env	Internal.Malware	Internal.Hacking	Internal.Social	Internal.Misuse	Internal.Physical	Internal.Error	Internal.Env	Partner.Malware	Partner.Hacking	Partner.Social	Partner.Misuse	Partner.Physical	Partner.Error	Partner.Env
Server.Conf	35%	48%	23%	2%	.	1%		.	2%	2%	5%	1%	2%		.	.	.	1%		.	
Server.Integ	35%	41%	23%	2%	.	1%		.	2%	2%	3%	1%	2%		.	.	.	.			
Server.Avail	1%	2%	1%			.		.	.		.	.	.								
Network.Conf	.	.	.	.	1%	.		.	.		.		.								
Network.Integ	.	.	.	.	1%	.		.	.		.		.								
Network.Avail		.	.			.			.				.								
User.Conf	35%	36%	22%	1%	32%	.		.	.	.	3%	1%	.					.			
User.Integ	35%	34%	22%	1%	32%	.		.	.	.	1%	1%	.					.			
User.Avail	.	.	.	.	1%			.	.		1%	.									
Media.Conf	.	.	2%	2%	1%					2%	5%	2%	.					.			
Media.Integ	.	.	2%	2%	1%					2%	3%	1%	.								
Media.Avail			.	.	1%	✔				.	.	1%									
People.Conf	22%	24%	29%	4%	1%			.		4%	4%	1%				.	.	.			
People.Integ	22%	24%	29%	4%	1%			.		4%	4%	1%				.	.	.			
People.Avail	.	2%	2%	1%	1%			.		.	1%	1%									

Data Breach Investigations Report by Verizon (2013)

- servers are a high-value target
- compromises / attacks affect both confidentiality and integrity

The “new” big threat: Data manipulation

US Officials’ View, Fall 2015

- data manipulation is the new big threat

Newest cyber threat will be data manipulation, US intelligence chief says

theguardian

- James Clapper calls data deletion or manipulation ‘next push of the envelope’
- US digital networks currently threatened by wide-scale data theft

Cyber security chief: Manipulation of data by hackers may be next threat

Pittsburgh Tribune-Review

Cybersecurity

Former NSA chief: Data manipulation an 'emerging art of war'

FCW THE BUSINESS OF FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY

But what happens when suddenly our data is manipulated, and you no longer can believe what you’re physically seeing?

The Wall Street Journal WSJ

a Digital Pearl Harbor

The C-I-A triad

Captures the three fundamental properties that make any system valuable

- **C**onfidentiality **+ I**ntegrity **+ A**vailability

Computer security seeks to prevent unauthorized viewing (confidentiality) or modification (integrity) of data while preserving access (availability)

2.1 Basic security concepts

What is Security?

Security is the prevention of, or protection against

- access to information by unauthorized recipients
- intentional but unauthorized destruction or alteration of that information

Definition from: *Dictionary of Computing,* Fourth Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996).

Security (informal definition)

- the protection of information systems from
  - theft or damage to the hardware, the software, and to the information on them, as well as from disruption or misdirection of the services they provide
  - any possible threat

The ‘Security’ game: What’s at stake?

- Computer systems comprise assets that have (some) **value**
  - e.g., laptops store vast personal or important information (files, photos, email, …)
  - personal, time dependent and often imprecise (e.g., monetary Vs. emotional)
- Valuable assets deserve **security protection**
  - to **preserve** their **value**,  expressed as a **security property**
    - e.g., personal photos should always be accessible by their owner
  - or to **prevent** (undesired) **harm**  examined as a concrete **attack**
    - e.g., permanent destruction of irreplaceable photos

The ‘Security’ game: Who are the players?

- **Defenders**
  - system owners (e.g., users, administrators, etc.)
  - seek to **enforce** one or more **security properties** or **defeat** certain **attacks**

property-based view

- **Attackers**
  - external entities (e.g., hackers, other users, etc.)
  - seek to launch attacks that **break** a **security property** or **impose** the system to certain **threats**



attack-based view

Security properties

- General statements about the value of a computer system
- Examples
  - The C-I-A triad
    - **confidentiality, integrity, availability**
  - (Some) other properties
    - **authentication / authenticity**
    - **authorization / appropriate use**
    - **non-repudiation / accountability / auditability**
    - **anonymity**

The C-I-A triad

- Captures the three fundamental properties that make any system valuable

Computer security seeks to prevent
unauthorized viewing (confidentiality)
or modification (integrity) of data, while preserving access (availability)

Confidentiality

- An asset is viewed only by authorized parties
  - e.g., conforming to originally-prescribed “read” rules <subject, object, access mode, policy> via access control
  - some other tools
    - encryption, obfuscation, sanitization, …

Integrity

- An asset is modified only by authorized parties
  - beyond conforming to originally-prescribed “write” access-control rules
  - precise, accurate, unmodified, modified in acceptable way by authorized people or processes, consistent, meaningful and usable
  - authorized actions, separation & protection of resources, error detection & correction
  - some tools
    - hashing, MACs

Availability

- An asset can be used by any authorized party
  - usable, meets service's needs, bounded waiting/completion time, acceptable outcome
  - timely response, fairness, concurrency, fault tolerance, graceful cessation (if needed)
  - some tools
    - redundancy, fault tolerance, distributed architectures

Authenticity

- The ability to determine that statements, policies, and permissions issued by persons or systems are genuine
  - some tools
    - digital signatures (cryptographic computations that allow entities to commit to the authenticity of their documents in a unique way)
      - achieve non-repudiation (authentic statements issued by some person or system cannot be denied)

Anonymity

- The property that certain records/transactions cannot be attributed to any individual
- some tools
  - aggregation
    - disclosure of statistics on combined data from many individuals that cannot be tied to any individual
  - proxies
    - trusted agents interacting on behalf on an individual in untraceable way
  - pseudonyms
    - fictional identities, known only to a trusted party, that fill in for real identities

The “Vulnerability - Threat - Control” paradigm

- A **vulnerability** is a weakness that could be exploited to cause harm
- A **threat** is a set of circumstances that could cause harm
- A **security control** is a mechanism that protects against harm
  - i.e., countermeasures designed to prevent threats from exercising vulnerabilities

Thus

- **Attackers** seek to **exploit** vulnerabilities in order to **impose** threats
- **Defenders** seek to **block** these threats by **controlling** the vulnerabilities

A “Vulnerability - Threat - Control” example



Example of threat

Eavesdropping: Interception of information intended for someone else during its transmission over a communication channel



Example of threat

Alteration: Unauthorized modification of information

- **Example:** the attacker-in-the-middle attack, where a network stream is
  - intercepted and
    - modified and retransmitted; or
    - dropped



Example of threat

Denial-of-service: Interruption or degradation of a data service or information access

- **Example:** email **spam,**
  to the degree that it is meant
  to simply fill up a mail queue
  and slow down an email server



Examples of threats

Masquerading: Fabrication of information that is purported to be from someone who is not actually the author

- e.g., IP spoofing attack: maliciously altering the source IP address of a message

Repudiation: Denial of a commitment or data receipt

- an attempt to back out of a contract/protocol that, e.g., requires the different parties to provide receipts acknowledging that data has been received



Example of vulnerability

Software bugs: Code is not doing what is supposed to be doing

- **Example:** Some application code is mistakenly using an algorithm for encryption that has been broken
- **Example:** There is no checking of array bounds

A hard-to-win game: Varied threats

Threats

- from natural to human
- from benign to malicious
- from random to targeted (APTs)



A hard-to-win game: Unknown enemy

Attackers

- beyond isolated “crazy” hackers
- organized groups/crime
  - may use computer crime (e.g., stealing CC#s) in order to finance other crimes
- terrorists
  - computers/assets as target, method, enabler, or enhancer



A hard-to-win game: Choose your battle

Risk management

- choose priorities
  - which threats to control
    - estimate possible harm & impact
  - what / how many resources to devote
    - estimate solution cost & protection level
- consider trade-offs balancing cost Vs. benefit
- compute the residual risk
  - decide on transfering risk or doing nothing

Never a “one-shot” game



A hard-to-win game: Best-effort approach

Deciding on controls relies on incomplete information

- likelihood of attack and impact of possible harm is impossible to measure perfectly
- full set of vulnerabilities is often unknown
  - weak authentication, lack of access control, errors in programs, etc.
- system's attack surface is often too wide
  - physical hazards, malicious attacks, stealthy theft by insiders, benign mistakes, impersonations, etc.

A useful strategy: The "method – opportunity – motive" view of an attack

- **deny any of them and the attack will (likely) fail**

A hard-to-win game: Best-effort approach (cont.)

Controls offer a wide range of protection level / efficacy

- they counter or neutralize threats or remove vulnerabilities in different ways

Types of controls

- prevent (attack is blocked)
- deter (attack becomes harder)
- deflect (change target of attack)
- mitigate (make impact less severe)
- contain (stop propagation of harm)
- detect (real time/after the fact)
- recover (from its effects)



Hard to balance cost/effectiveness of controls with likelihood/severity of threats

A hard-to-win game: Security tradeoffs

Often complete security against all conceivable adversaries is unfeasible

- More often than not, tradeoffs are unavoidable
  - Risk mitigation Vs. cost of deploying defense mechanisms
    - Here, cost refers to many other aspects (beyond monetary expenses)
    - Human factors, e.g., user acceptance and usability of defense mechanisms

Example of control: HTTPS protocol

Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Authenticity
- Anonymity

Example of control: RAID technology

Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID)

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Authenticity
- Anonymity



Example of control: TOR protocol

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Authenticity
- Anonymity



Exciting times to study (or work in) Security!

Relevance to practice & real-world importance

- plethora of real-world problems & real needs for security solutions
- combination of different research areas within CS and across other fields
- multi-dimensional topic of study
  - protocol design, system building, user experience, social/economic aspects
- wide range of perspectives
  - practical / systems – foundations / theory, attacker's Vs. defender's view

2.2 Symmetric-key encryption

Confidentiality

Fundamental security property

- **an asset is viewed only by authorized parties**
- "C" in the CIA triad

> *"computer security seeks to prevent **unauthorized viewing (confidentiality)** or modification (integrity) of **data** while preserving access (availability)"*

Eavesdropping

- main threat against confidentiality of **in-transit** data



Problem setting: Secret communication

Two parties wish to communicate over a channel

- Alice (sender/source) wants to send a message m to Bob (recipient/destination)

Underlying channel is unprotected

- Eve (attacker/adversary) can eavesdrop any sent messages
- e.g., packet sniffing over networked or wireless communications

Alice m

m Bob

Solution concept: Symmetric-key encryption

Main idea

- secretly transform message so that it is **unintelligible** while in transit
  - Alice **encrypts** her message m to **ciphertext c**, which is sent instead of **plaintext m**
  - Bob **decrypts** received message c to original message m
  - Eve can intercept c but "**cannot learn**" m from c
  - Alice and Bob share a **secret key k** that is used for both message transformations



Security tool: Symmetric-key encryption scheme

Abstract cryptographic primitive, **a.k.a. cipher**, defined by

- a **message space $\mathcal{M}$**; and
- a triplet of algorithms **(Gen, Enc, Dec)**
  - Gen is randomized algorithm, Enc may be raldomized, whereas Dec is deterministic
  - Gen outputs a uniformly random key k (from some key space $\mathcal{K}$)



Desired properties for symmetric-key encryption scheme

By design, any symmetric-key encryption scheme should satisfy the following

- **efficiency**: key generation & message transformations "are fast"
- **correctness**: for all m and k, it holds that Dec(Enc(m, k) , k) = m
- **security**: one "cannot learn" plaintext m from ciphertext c



(Auguste) Kerckhoff's principle (1883)

"The cipher method must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy without inconvenience."

Reasoning

- due to security & correctness, Alice & Bob must share some secret info
- if no shared key captures this secret info, it must be captured by Enc, Dec
- but keeping Enc, Dec secret is problematic
  - harder to keep secret an algorithm than a short key (e.g., after user revocation)
  - harder to change an algorithm than a short key (e.g., after secret info is exposed)
  - riskier to rely on custom/ad-hoc schemes than publicly scrutinized/standardized ones

(Auguste) Kerckhoff's principle (1883)

"The cipher method must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy without inconvenience."

General good-hygiene principle (beyond encryption)

- Security relies solely on keeping secret keys
- System architecture and algorithms are publicly available
- Claude Shannon (1949): *"one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them"*
- Opposite of "security by obscurity" practice

Symmetric-key encryption

- Also referred to as simply “symmetric encryption”



Symmetric Vs. Asymmetric encryption



(a) Symmetric Cryptosystem



(b) Asymmetric Cryptosystem

Main application areas

Secure communication

- **encrypt messages** sent among parties
- assumption
  - Alice and Bob **securely generate, distribute & store shared key k**
  - attacker does not learn key k

Secure storage

- **encrypt files** outsourced to the cloud
- assumption
  - Alice **securely generates & stores key k**
  - attacker does not learn key k



Brute-force attack

Generic attack

- given a captured ciphertext c and known key space $\mathcal{K}$, Dec
- strategy is an **exhaustive search**
  - for all possible keys k in $\mathcal{K}$
    - determine if Dec (c,k) is a likely plaintext m
- **requires some knowledge on the message space $\mathcal{M}$**
  - i.e., structure of the plaintext (e.g., PDF file or email message)

Countermeasure

- key should be a **random** value from a **sufficiently large** key space $\mathcal{K}$ to make exhaustive search attacks **infeasible**

2.3 Classical ciphers

Substitution ciphers

Large class of ciphers: each letter is **uniquely** replaced by another

- key is a (random) permutation over the alphabet characters
- there are 26! ≈ 4×10^{26} possible substitution ciphers
- huge key space (larger than the # of starts in universe)

- e.g., one popular substitution "cipher" for some Internet posts is ROT13
- historically
  - all classical ciphers are of this type



Classical ciphers – general structure

Class of ciphers based on letter substitution

- message space $\mathcal{M}$ is "**valid words**" from a given alphabet
  - e.g., English text without spaces, punctuation or numerals
  - characters can be represented as numbers in [0:25]
- based on a predetermined **1-1** character mapping
  - map each (plaintext) character into another **unique** (ciphertext) character
  - typically defined as a "**shift**" of each plaintext character by a **fixed** per alphabet character number of positions in a canonical ordering of the characters in the alphabet
- encryption: character shifting occurs with "**wrap-around**" (using mod 26 addition)
- decryption: **undo shifting** of characters with "wrap-around" (using mod 26 subtraction)

Limitations of substitution ciphers

Generally, susceptible to **frequency (and other statistical) analysis**

- letters in a natural language, like English, are not uniformly distributed
- cryptographic attacks against substitution ciphers are possible
  - e.g., by exploiting knowledge of letter frequencies, including pairs and triples
    - most frequent letters in English: e, t, o, a, n, i, ...
    - most frequent digrams: th, in, er, re, an, ...
    - most frequent trigrams: the, ing, and, ion, ...
  - Attack framework first described in a 9th century book by al-Kindi

Letter frequency in (sufficiently large) English text



Classical ciphers – examples



(Julius) Caesar's cipher

- shift each character in the message by 3 positions
  - I.e., 3 instead of 13 positions as in ROT-13
- cryptanalysis
  - **no secret key is used** – based on “security by obscurity”
  - thus the code is trivially insecure once knows Enc (or Dec)

Classical ciphers – examples (II)

Shift cipher

- **keyed extension** of Caesar's cipher
- randomly set key k in [0:25]
  - shift each character in the message by k positions
- cryptanalysis
  - **brute-force attacks** are effective given that
    - **key space is small** (26 possibilities or, actually, 25 as 0 should be avoided)
    - message space M is **restricted to "valid words"**
      - e.g., corresponding to valid English text

Alternative attack against “shift cipher”

- brute-force attack + inspection if English “make sense” is quite **manual**
- a better **automated** attack is based on statistics
  - if character i (in [0:25]) in the alphabet has frequency p_i (in [0..1]), then
    - from known statistics, we know that $\Sigma_i\ p_i^2 \approx 0.065$, so
    - since character i (in plaintext) is mapped to character i + k (in ciphertext)
      - if $L_j = \Sigma_i\ p_i\ q_{i+j}$, then we expect that $L_k \approx 0.065$ (q_i: frequency of character i in ciphertext)
- thus, a brute-force attack can **test** all possible keys w.r.t. the **above criterion**
  - the search space **remains the same**
  - yet, the condition to finish the search **becomes much simpler**: Choose j so that $L_j \approx 0.065$

Classical ciphers – examples (III)

Mono-alphabetic substitution cipher

- **generalization** of shift cipher
- key space defines **permutation** on alphabet
  - use a **1-1 mapping between characters** in the alphabet to produce ciphertext
  - i.e., shift each **distinct** character in the plaintext (by some appropriate number of positions defined by the key) to get a **distinct** character in the ciphertext
- cryptanalysis
  - key space is large (of the order of 26! or ~2^{88}) but cipher is vulnerable to attacks
  - character mapping is **fixed** by key so **plaintext & ciphertext exhibit same statistics**

2.4 Perfect secrecy

Security tool: Symmetric-key encryption scheme

Abstract cryptographic primitive, **a.k.a. cipher**, defined by

- a **message space $\mathcal{M}$**; and
- a triplet of algorithms **(Gen, Enc, Dec)**
  - Gen is randomized algorithm, Enc may be raldomized, whereas Dec is deterministic
  - Gen outputs a uniformly random key k (from some key space $\mathcal{K}$)



Probabilistic formulation

Desired properties

- Efficiency
- Correctness
- Security

Our setting so far is a random experiment

- a message m is chosen according to $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$
- a key k is chosen according to $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{K}}$
- $\text{Enc}_k(m) \rightarrow c$ is given to the adversary

Perfect correctness

For any $k \in \mathcal{K}$, $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and any ciphertext c output of $Enc_k(m)$,

it holds that

$$\Pr[\, Dec_k(c) = m \,] = 1$$

Perfect security

Defining security for an encryption scheme is not trivial

- what we mean by "Eve "cannot learn" m (from c)" ?

Attempt 1: Protect the key k!

- Security means that

the adversary should **not** be able to **compute the key k**

- Intuition
  - it'd better be the case that the key is protected!...
- Problem
  - this definition fails to exclude clearly insecure schemes
  - e.g., the key is never used, such as when $Enc_k(m) := m$

necessary condition

but not
sufficient condition!

Attempt 2: Don’t learn m!

- Security means that

the adversary should **not** be able to **compute the message m**

- Intuition
  - it’d better be the case that the message m is not learned...
- Problem
  - this definition fails to exclude clearly undesirable schemes
  - e.g., those that protect m partially, i.e., they reveal the least significant bit of m

Attempt 3: Learn nothing!

- Security means that

  the adversary should **not** be able to **learn any information about m**

- Intuition
  - it seems close to what we should aim for perfect secrecy…
- Problem
  - this definition ignores the adversary's prior knowledge on $\mathcal{M}$
  - e.g., distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ may be known or estimated
    - m is a valid text message, or one of "`attack`", "`no attack`" is to be sent

Attempt 4: Learn nothing more!

- Security means that

  the adversary should **not** be able to **learn any <u>additional</u> information on m**

- How can we formalize this?

Alice **m**

$\mathbf{Enc_k(m) \rightarrow c}$

m = { `attack` w/ prob. 0.8 ; `no attack` w/ prob. 0.2 }

Eve's view remains the same!



m = { `attack` w/ prob. 0.8 ; `no attack` w/ prob. 0.2 }

Two equivalent views of perfect secrecy

a posteriori = a priori ~ **C is independent of M**

For every $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$, m ∈ $\mathcal{M}$ and c ∈ $\mathcal{C}$, for which Pr [C = c] > 0, it holds that

Pr[M = m | C = c] = Pr[M = m]

For every m, m' ∈ $\mathcal{M}$ and c ∈ $\mathcal{C}$, it holds that

Pr[Enc_K(m) = c] = Pr[Enc_K(m') = c]

random experiment

$\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}} \rightarrow$ **m = M**

$\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{K}} \rightarrow$ k = K

Enc_k(m) → c = C

Eve's view remains the same!



Perfect secrecy (or information-theoretic security)

Definition 1

A symmetric-key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space $\mathcal{M}$, is **perfectly secret** if for every $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$, every message m ∈ $\mathcal{M}$ and every ciphertext c ∈ C for which Pr [C = c] > 0, it holds that

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[M = m]$$

- Intuitively
  - the *a posteriori* probability that any given message m was actually sent is the **same** as the *a priori* probability that m would have been sent
  - observing the ciphertext reveals **nothing (new)** about the underlying plaintext

Alternative view of perfect secrecy

Definition 2

A symmetric-key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) with message space $\mathcal{M}$, is **perfectly secret** if for every messages m, m' ∈ $\mathcal{M}$ and every c ∈ C, it holds that

$$\Pr[\ \mathrm{Enc}_K(m) = c\ ] = \Pr[\ \mathrm{Enc}_K(m') = c\ ]$$

- Intuitively
  - the probability distribution $\mathcal{D}_C$ **does not depend** on the plaintext
  - i.e., M and C are **independent** random variables
  - the ciphertext contains "**no information**" about the plaintext
  - "**impossible to distinguish**" an encryption of **m** from an encryption of **m'**

2.5 The one-time pad

The one-time pad: A perfect cipher

A type of "substitution" cipher that is "absolutely unbreakable"

- invented in 1917 Gilbert Vernam and Joseph Mauborgne
- "substitution" cipher
  - **individually** replace plaintext characters with **shifted** ciphertext characters
  - **independently** shift each message character in a **random** manner
    - to encrypt a plaintext of length n, use n uniformly random keys $k_1, \ldots, k_n$
- "absolutely unbreakable"
  - **perfectly secure** (when used correctly)
  - based on message-symbol specific **independently random** shifts

The one-time pad (OTP) cipher

Fix n to be any positive integer; set $\mathcal{M} = C = \mathcal{K} = \{0,1\}^n$

- **Gen**: choose n bits uniformly at random (each bit independently w/ prob. .5)
  - Gen $\rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$
- **Enc**: given a key and a message of equal lengths, compute the bit-wise XOR
  - $\text{Enc}(k, m) = \text{Enc}_k(m) \rightarrow k \oplus m$ (i.e., mask the message with the key)
- **Dec**: compute the bit-wise XOR of the key and the ciphertext
  - $\text{Dec}(k, c) = \text{Dec}_k(c) := k \oplus c$
- Correctness
  - trivially, $k \oplus c = k \oplus k \oplus m = 0 \oplus m = m$

OTP is perfectly secure (using Definition 2)

For all n-bit long messages m_1 and m_2 and ciphertexts c, it holds that

$$\Pr[E_K(m_1) = c] = \Pr[E_K(m_2) = c],$$

where probabilities are measured over the possible keys chosen by Gen.

Proof

- events "$Enc_K(m_1) = c$", "$m_1 \oplus K = c$" and "$K = m_1 \oplus c$" are equal-probable
- K is chosen at random, irrespectively of m_1 and m_2, with probability 2^{-n}
- thus, the ciphertext does not reveal anything about the plaintext

OTP characteristics

A "substitution" cipher

- encrypt an n-symbol m using n uniformly random "shift keys" $k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_n$

2 equivalent views

- $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{M} = C$
- "shift" method

view 1 $\{0,1\}^n$

bit-wise XOR ($m \oplus k$)

or

view 2 G, (G,+) is a group

addition/subtraction (m +/- k)

Perfect secrecy

- since each shift is random, every ciphertext is equally likely for any plaintext

Limitations (on efficiency)

- "shift keys" (1) are **as long as messages** & (2) **can be used only once**

Perfect, but impractical

In spite of its perfect security, OTP has two notable weaknesses

- the key has to be **as long as** the plaintext
  - limited applicability
  - key-management problem
- the key **cannot be reused** (thus, the “one-time” pad)
  - if reused, perfect security is not satisfied
    - e.g., reusing a key once, leaks the XOR of two plaintext messages
    - this type of leakage can be devastating against secrecy

These weakness are detrimental to secure communication

- securely distributing fresh long keys is as hard as securely exchanging messages…

Importance of OTP weaknesses

Inherent trade-off between efficiency / practicality Vs. perfect secrecy

- historically, OTP has been used efficiently & insecurely
  - repeated use of one-time pads compromised communications during the cold war
    - NSA decrypted Soviet messages that were transmitted in the 1940s
    - that was possible because the Soviets reused the keys in the one-time pad scheme
- modern approaches resemble OTP encryption
  - efficiency via use of pseudorandom OTP keys
  - “almost perfect” secrecy



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VENONA

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

USSR

Ref. No.: [redacted] (of 8/7/1953)

[redacted] Issued: [redacted]10/9/74

Copy No.: 304

3RD REISSUE

"19" REPORTS ON DISCUSSIONS WITH "KAPITAN", "KABAN" AND ZAMESTITEL' ON THE SECOND FRONT

(1943)

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

No: 812

29 May 1943

To VIKTOR[i].

"19"[ii] reports that "KAPITAN"[iii] and "KABAN"[iv], during conversations in the "COUNTRY [STRANA][v]", invited "19" to join them and ZAMESTITEL'[vi] openly told "KABAN"

[10 groups unrecovered]

second front against GERMANY this year. KABAN considers that, if a second front should prove to be unsuccessful, then this [3 groups unrecovered] harm to Russian interests and [6 groups unrecovered]. He considers it more advantageous and effective to weaken GERMANY by bombing and to use this time for "[4 groups unrecovered] political crisis so that there may be no doubt that a second front next year will prove successful."

ZAMESTITEL' and

[14 groups unrecovered]

". 19 thinks that "KAPITAN" is not informing ZAMESTITEL' of important military decisions and that therefore ZAMESTITEL' may not have exact knowledge of [1 group unrecovered] with the opening of a second front against GERMANY and its postponement from this year to next year. 19 says that ZAMESTITEL' personally is an ardent supporter of a second front at this time and considers postponement

[Continued overleaf]

VENONA

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]